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After a theoretical overview of factors which could influence aldermen’s use of information, this paper
presents some findings of survey research on 262 aldermen of 140 Dutch municipalities with 20,000 or
more inhabitants. The findings of the survey indicate that many respondents considered the output-
orientedness of planning and control documents to be far from perfect. Moreover, many aldermen hardly
appreciated the output-oriented information on developments and performances that was available in their
organizations.
The sources of performance information of which most aldermen – who are elected politicians -
made by far the most use were informal, verbal consultations and formal meetings with official top
managers. They made much less use of, for example, formal, written information in budgets, annual
reports, and management reports. A statistical analysis of the variables in the survey showed that certain
characteristics may influence aldermen’s opinions on and use of various sources of performance
information. However, the analysis did not always indicate significant differences between information
preferences of subgroups of aldermen.
(also downloadable) in electronic version: http://som.rug.nl/








Many governmental organizations in Western countries have now introduced elements of New
Public Management (NPM). NPM has several doctrinal components, such as an emphasis on
output orientation, private sector management styles and developing explicit standards and
measures of performance (Hood (1991), pp. 4-5; Dunleavy and Hood (1994), p. 9). Traditionally,
public organizations have emphasized input controls (i.e. budgets are not to be exceeded),
compliance with rules and procedures, and separation of duties. NPM involves a wider control
scope in which outputs are supposed to be the focus of attention.
Many Dutch municipalities were encouraged to introduce NPM elements during the
Policy and Management Instruments Project for Municipalities (PMI), which ran in the
Netherlands from 1988 to 1995 (Van Helden (1998a; 1998b)). The municipalities included
quantitative performance indicators in their budgets and several of them developed performance
or output budgets. In addition, many Dutch municipalities divisionalized their organizations.
Many Dutch municipalities used a fairly uniform concept of output budgeting for all their
policy fields, especially in the initial phases of its introduction (see e.g. Schrijvers (1993)). Public
organizations in other countries probably did the same. Rainey ((1999), p. 139) observes that
governmental administrative reforms are often imposed in a top-down fashion, mandating that all
parts of the organization adopt the same reforms (see also Humphrey, Miller and Scapens (1993),
pp. 18-23). Many early advocates of NPM seem to suggest a strong focus on output-oriented
management control in all parts of government organizations, regardless of their activities and
environments. It seems that fairly uniform planning and control reports are used. In addition,
there is often little differentiation in information about outputs (and related performances, such as
activities which contribute directly to outputs) which is presented to various groups of users.
In order to successfully implement (major) changes in accounting systems, a strong
commitment of the top of an organization to these changes is often regarded as a prerequisite.
Moreover, management’s use of the new system and the information it produces is regarded as
essential to convince employees in the organization of the use of the changes (see e.g. Shields and
Young (1989), Player and Keys (1995a; 1995b), Shields and McEwan (1996), Ter Bogt and Van
Helden (2000)). The introduction of output budgets is a major change in the municipal accounting
system.
Earlier small scale case research in three big Dutch municipalities has shown that the
aldermen which were interviewed only limitedly used performance information which is
available in budgets and other planning and control documents (Ter Bogt (2001)). In the
Netherlands aldermen are elected politicians. Although official managers are mostly responsible
for day-to-day management of municipal organizations, aldermen are often heavily engaged in
the governance and political management and control of municipal organizations. As aldermen
are the political top of municipal organizations, it seems to be important to know whether they
really use the output-oriented planning and control documents, thus showing the relevance of
these documents and the performance information in it to the civil servants in the organization. If
it would turn out that many politicians prefer other information sources, or that certain
characteristics of politicians influence their ‘information preferences’, this could be relevant for
ž PAGE  − 3
developing future, probably more ‘tailor-made’ (accounting) information systems in
municipalities.
The literature on management and organization suggests that several characteristics
influence management control and the kind of information which managers want and / or need for
their work. The types of control and information which a manager uses can vary according to,
among others, the kinds of activities of the organization where the manager works, social
influences and personal factors. Aldermen, too, could differ with regard to the forms of control
and the kinds and sources of performance information they prefer. It is interesting to explore how
far this literature also applies to the political top of municipalities.
A first aim of this paper is to discuss some literature on information use by managers, and
relate it – in the form of propositions - to aldermen in municipalities. Second, the paper intends to
explore and describe aldermen’s opinions on and use of various sources of performance
information. A third aim is to present statistical findings about specific aspects of information use
by aldermen. These findings may give tentative indications of the empirical evidence with respect
to the propositions developed.
Section 2 presents some recent experiences with control and performance measurement in
governmental organizations. After this, the extensive section 3 reviews some literature on
management control, managers’ use of information and aspects which can influence this control
and use. This literature is linked with the work and position of aldermen of Dutch municipalities.
Most of the literature presented in this section could be regarded as being rather basic and having
been developed primarily for profit organizations. It is interesting, however, to consider the
relevance of this literature to public organizations which want to adopt private sector styles,
specifically various groups of aldermen. A number of general propositions are developed. In
section 4 the survey research is introduced. Section 5 presents some findings of the survey and a
statistical analysis of the data. Specific elements of the propositions developed in section 3 are
statistically tested. In section 6 the results of the survey are discussed and some conclusions and
limitations are presented.
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Traditionally, many divisionalized profit organizations strongly emphasize output or results
controls. Such forms of control focus on the results of the work performed by an employee or an
organizational unit. Output or results controls are sensibly applied if the results are measurable
and if the management knows what results are needed to achieve organizational goals (Merchant
(1982), pp. 49-50; Simons (2000), pp. 62-67; see also Otley and Berry (1980), pp. 236-237).
In the last ten to fifteen years companies in the profit sector have shown an increasing
interest in information about several aspects of their production processes because they want to
improve control of their organizations. Indicators of innovativeness, customer satisfaction, and
aspects of the production process have been added to indicators of outputs and results, which
often have a strong financial focus. The companies have introduced, for example, performance
indicators of process quality, throughput, costs of business processes, time, and manufacturing
flexibility in their management accounting systems (Kaplan and Norton (1992); Simons (2000),
pp. 193-196 and 237-238; Hirsch (2000), pp. 607-611). Process controls make sense if managers
understand the cause-and-effect relationship between an organization’s activities, i.e. the process,
and its outputs. Qualitative information now plays a more important role in profit organizations,
besides quantitative information.
At the same time many government organizations shifted their official control focus from
mainly inputs to outputs and quantitative performance indicators. Of course nowadays
government organizations in the Netherlands also introduced some quantitative performance
indicators of process aspects (see Ter Bogt (2001); Bordewijk and Klaassen (2000)). However,
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officially many municipalities still emphasize output-orientedness. They are developing, for
example, performance or output budgets which not only contain information about numbers of
outputs, but also give information on cost per unit of output, and they try to uniformly introduce
such budgets for all parts of their organizations.
However, it seems that NPM and the introduction of output budgets and output-oriented
performance indicators are not always a complete success (see for the Netherlands e.g. Van
Helden (1998a); Van Helden (2000); Bordewijk and Klaassen (2000); Ter Bogt (2001); Jansen
(2000); Van Helden en Ter Bogt (2001)). Without being exhaustive, the following reasons for a
lack of success have been mentioned: incompleteness of performance measurement, insufficient
capacity to implement changes, bureaucratic and change resistent culture in public organizations,
ephemeral and rhetorical character of reforms, disregard of involvement of middle management
and citizens, and immeasurableness of many governmental outputs (see among others Smith
(1993), pp. 139-149; McKevitt and Lawton (1996), pp. 51-54; Van Helden (1998b); Olson,
Guthrie and Humphrey (1998), pp. 455-456; Bowerman (1998), pp. 400-407; Ter Bogt (1999);
Rainey (1999), pp. 136-139; Kloot and Martin (2000), pp. 245-249; Ter Bogt and Van Helden
(2000); Pollitt and Bouckaert (2000), pp. 129-132 and 152-154; Sanderson (2001), pp 307-309).
The limited success of the promotion of output-orientedness and performance
measurement might also be related to the differences between public and private organizations
(with respect to, for example, equity and the concreteness of many goals and tasks). Moreover,
the concept of ‘managerialism’, which is an important element in New Public Management, could
be too limited for the Dutch situation, ‘ignoring the relations with the social policy environment,
the pluri-centrism of administration itself, and the variety of values that play a part’ (Kickert
(1997), p. 742). In this respect it is important to observe that economic rationality and economic
efficiency are probably not the same as political rationality and political efficiency (Wildavsky
(1966), pp. 307-310; Ter Bogt (1997), p. 45; see also Moe (1990); Horn (1995), pp. 7-10 and
182-184); Ahonen and Salminen (1997), pp. 41-50). Presumably, politicians are not only
interested in economic efficiency but also in, for example, equity. This is the more true because
members of certain interest groups and other citizens, who are the voters in elections, do not only
judge politicians on economic efficiency (see also Wilson (1989), pp. 131-134).
As was indicated before, the introduction of output budgets and performance indicators is
a major change in the municipal accounting system. The succesful implementation of such a
change could ask for a strong commitment of aldermen, who are the political top of the
organization.1 To better understand the forms of control and the sources of performance
information which aldermen use, it could be helpful to consider some literature on management
control and use of information.
($	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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This section will discuss literature on some aspects which might influence aldermen’s control
styles and their use of certain sources of information. The literature considered here relates, on
the one hand, to characteristics of the production processes and tasks for which the aldermen bear
responsibility and, on the other hand, to some social and situational characteristics of the
aldermen. The aspects which are discussed here are determined both by the possible importance
of the aspects regarded and by the public availibility of information on certain characteristics of
aldermen. In itself, it could be interesting to study more aspects which may influence aldermen’s
information preferences. However, that would have increased the length of the questionnaire
which was send to the aldermen, which probably would negatively influence the response rate.
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What indications of forms of control and sources of information to be used in certain situations
can be derived from management and accounting literature?
The almost classical and relatively simple frameworks by Ouchi and Hofstede are
presented here because they can be helpful in a first analysis of governmental organizations.2 The
frameworks are simplified models of reality. However, they do not necessarily lack any practical
meaning. They direct one’s attention to some concrete, basic factors which may be relevant for
control of governmental organizations.
The Ouchi and Hofstede models focus on the ‘technological’ aspects of outputs and
transformation processes as determinants of the forms of control to be applied. Social aspects and
characteristics of individual managers are not taken into consideration. However, it is in principle
possible to integrate technically oriented, ‘rational’ models of control and performance
measurement with political science perspectives and psychological, organizational, or symbolic
approaches (Osborne, et al. (1995), pp. 21-30; see also Olson, Guthrie and Humphrey (1998), p.
455).
Ouchi ((1977), pp. 97-98; (1979), pp. 843-845) distinguishes three types of control:
output measurement (and output control), behaviour measurement (and action and process
controls), and rituals and ceremonies (‘clan’ control). The knowledge of transformation processes
and the ability to measure outputs determine the types of control to be used to control an
organization. ‘In order to apply behavior control, the organization must possess at least
agreement, if not true knowledge, about means-ends relationships. The process through which
inputs are transformed into outputs must be felt to be known before supervisors can rationally
achieve control by watching and guiding the behavior of their subordinates’ (Ouchi (1977), p.
97). To apply output control, no understanding of transformation processes is needed, but there
must be reliable and valid measures of the desired outputs. If there is no understanding of
transformation processes and outputs are unmeasurable, only ritualized control is possible (Ouchi
(1977), pp. 97-98).
Hofstede observes that each organization performs a range of activities for which various
forms of control are required. That is why he speaks of the management control of activities
rather than of organizations. In his framework, four criteria determine which control form is
applicable to an activity (Hofstede, 1981, p. 194; see also Otley and Berry, (1980)):
- ambiguity in the aims of the activity;
- measurability of outputs;
- knowledge of the effects of management interventions (i.e. knowledge of transformation
processes);
- the degree to which the activity is repetitious.
Hofstede distinguishes six types of control (Hofstede (1981), pp. 195-198). To be able to apply
‘routine controls’, for example, objectives have to be unambiguous, outputs measurable, effects
of interventions known and the activity repetitive. This type of control can be prescribed in
precise rules .H9Ł 94‡Â803ˆ w ` àÃ `ó ‚à ãâ@<
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structures, negotiation processes, the need for distribution of scarce resources, particular interests
and conflicting values’ (Hofstede, 1981, p. 198).
With respect to the role a management information system – which included the accounting
information system - can play in the control of an organization, it is interesting to briefly consider
Earl and Hopwood’s (1980) normative views. Their framework is also based on technical
characteristics of production processes: uncertainty about objectives and uncertainty about cause-
and-effect relationships (i.e. knowledge of transformation processes).
When there is little uncertainty about both objectives and transformation processes,
accounting information functions as an ‘answer machine’ which provides answers to any control
problems. In this situation, rules, formulae and accounting techniques can be used to solve the
control problems by computation (Earl and Hopwood, 1980, p. 8). When there is either much
uncertainty about objectives or much uncertainty about transformation processes, an information
system can still be helpful to managers. It can help managers analyse the analysable, explore
problems, define what is uncertain, ask questions, gather different points of view or seek conflict
resolution. Accounting information can be a ‘learning machine’ or a ‘dialogue machine’, but it
cannot provide clear answers to managers’ control problems. When both objectives and cause-
and-effect relationships are uncertain, a formal accounting system is only an ‘idea machine’
which can provide multiple streams of information and thought, which trigger creativity and
inspiration.
The emphasis on output-orientedness in New Public Management indicates that output or routine
controls are the preferred types of control for governmental organizations. Outputs are supposed
to be good proxies for the ultimate outcomes which the organizations want to realize. However,
how do the activities of Dutch municipal organizations compare with the conditions to be fulfilled
in order to make routine and output controls applicable?
There are probably differences between activities within any part of an organization as far
as output measurability and understanding of transformation processes are concerned (see also
Hofstede (1981)). However, it seems that certain parts of municipal organizations perform
relatively concrete tasks and activities, produce outputs which are relatively easy to measure,
provide good knowledge of transformation processes and have relatively clear objectives. For
example, public works departments and refuse collection departments perform mostly concrete
activities. There is probably little uncertainty about objectives in these departments and the
measurability of their outputs and the knowledge of their transformation processes are relatively
high.
Conversely, for departments with less concrete tasks like educational policy, culture, and
welfare, it may be difficult to measure outputs. Moreover, there can be relatively much
uncertainty about objectives and transformation processes. In these departments, it is probably
difficult to clearly indicate how municipal activities (and outputs) contribute to the ultimate
desired outcomes.
According to Ouchi and Hofstede, the differences mentioned above have consequences for the
types of management control - each with their own information requirements - which managers
can apply. In the public works and refuse collection departments accounting information, i.e.
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information on performances, might be helpful to solve control problems and to a certain extent
the conditions to apply routine or output controls might be fullfilled. This is probably hardly the
case for tasks like educational policy, culture, and welfare.
Although differences exist between profit and government organizations, Ouchi’s
framework and Hofstede’s - which is supposed to be generally applicable - offer a basic control
framework whose applicability depends mainly on the ‘technical’ features of an organization.
These thoughts on Ouchi’s and Hofstede’s control frameworks and differences between
municipal activities, have resulted in a first proposition, which has been formulated in general
terms:
1. As the concreteness and measurability of outputs increase and the knowledge of
transformation processes increases, there is an increase in aldermen’s possibilities of
applying output-oriented types of control and in their preferences for output information
in formal planning and control reports to evaluate the performances of the municipal
departments for which they are responsible.
(()			&		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To control an organization, managers need information. Their information requirements can
differ, depending on such aspects as uncertainty about tasks, measurability of outputs, clearness
about objectives and knowledge of transformation processes. Managers receive information from
various internal and external sources (Mintzberg (1972), pp. 93-94).
Mintzberg observed that many managerial tasks involve judgment rather than formal
analysis. Managers often prefer rapid, informal, and speculative information to absolutely right
information; and they prefer information in the form of concrete stimuli or triggers (i.e. no
general aggregates) and the spoken word to other forms of communication (see also Bartlett and
Ghoshal (1995), pp. 139-141). However, formal management information systems give managers
precise, aggregated, historical and written information (Mintzberg (1972), pp. 94-96; (1980),
pp.148-149; see also Donabedian, McKinnon and Bruns (1998), pp. 372-377).
Earl and Hopwood’s views on the technical characteristics of production processes and
the role of management information systems to control organizations were discussed already.
This section concentrates on the relationship between technical characteristics of production
processes and the types of information managers prefer.
According to Daft and MacIntosh (1978), such aspects as the wish to provide ‘trigger
information’ and managers’ personality traits - such as aspiration level and tolerance for
ambiguity - can play a part in the construction of management information systems. However,
they also think that departmental production technology is a very important factor. They see a
strong relationship between, on the one hand, the amount and type of information managers
require and, on the other hand, the degree of uncertainty with which managers are confronted.
The degree of uncertainty depends on 		 (i.e. frequence with which
unexpected and new events are encountered in transformation processes) and  
		 (i.e. knowledge of transformation processes) in an organization (Daft and
MacIntosh (1978), pp. 83-84).
The degree of uncertainty with which managers are confronted determines the sources
and ‘richness’ of information which managers need in order to control the activities for which
they are responsible (Daft and MacIntosh (1978); see also Daft and Lengel (1990)). Richness has
been defined as the ‘potential information-carrying capacity of data’ (Daft and Lengel, 1990, p.
248). Managers will prefer rich information when they are confronted with high levels of task
variety and when they have little understanding of transformation processes (see also Macintosh
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(1985), pp. 227-231; McKinnon and Bruns (1992), pp.45-46 and 57-62; Donabedian, McKinnon
and Bruns (1998), pp. 390-393).
Formal numeric information - such as budget information - and formal, written
information - such as information in documents and reports - are not types of ‘rich’ information.
Such information sources generate feedback slowly; they are limited to what is on paper, without
other visual clues being possible; and they are impersonal in nature. Information provided in face-
to-face encounters is the richest information. It is personal in nature and generates immediate
feedback, so that the correctness of interpretations can be checked. Face-to-face information also
allows simultaneous observation of multiple clues, including facial expression and tone of voice.
Telephone calls, for example, are less rich in information because they do not include visual
contacts (Daft and Lengel (1990), pp. 248-250).
Rational choice models of communication and use of information presume that every
communication medium has fixed, inherent properties, e.g. a particular degree of information
richness, regardless of its context or who uses it. Individuals who are aware of the inherent
differences between media are supposed to make efficiency-motivated, objectively rational,
independent choices between media (Fulk, Schmitz, and Steinfeld, 1990, pp. 119-120). The
rational choice model of information presented by Daft, Lengel and MacIntosh presumes that
managers prefer ‘simple’, standard and lean information in situations with low uncertainty, i.e.
when they face highly analysable, routine problems. According to this model, managers prefer
‘rich’, flexible, and personally obtained information in highly uncertain situations. Top managers
often work on such issues as strategy, policy matters, organizational culture, serious incidents,
and relations with their external environment. They generally have little knowledge of cause-and-
effect relationships as far as these mostly nonroutine issues are concerned. In order to perform
such complex tasks, top managers prefer rich information and not formal, standard information.
If Daft, MacIntosh and Lengel are right, uncertainty aspects also may play a part in
aldermen’s information preferences. Of course all aldermen belong to the political top of
municipal organizations, regardless of their specific tasks and portfolios (i.e. the policy fields for
which they are responsible). They all have to work in a relatively complex and uncertain political
environment (see also Duncan, 1972, p. 320), so each of them might have a relatively strong
preference for rich information. However, their specific tasks and portfolios – with varying
degrees of uncertainty - might also influence their information preferences (see also Donabedian,
McKinnon and Bruns (1998), pp. 381-383). This could mean that, for example, aldermen who are
responsible for public works or refuse collection make more use of performance information in
planning and control reports than aldermen who are responsible for such policy fields as
education, culture or welfare.
These thoughts on managers’ use of certain types and sources of information have
resulted in proposition 2a and the more specific ‘sub-proposition’ 2b, which together make up the
second proposition:
2a. Because of the complexities and uncertainties of aldermen’s tasks and the environments
in which aldermen work, they have a relatively strong preference for rich information and lowly
appreciate formal performance information in planning and control documents.
2b. The greater the uncertainties arising from the tasks and transformation processes in the
policy fields in their portfolios, the more aldermen will prefer sources of rich information.
(,   	 	  	 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Besides ‘rational choices’, social influences can play a role in a manager’s decision to use certain
sources of information. Sense-making, behaviour, and opinions on rationality are in part
subjective and socially influenced, for example by statements and behaviour of people or
organizations in similar conditions. Individuals rely even more strongly on social comparison
processes and social influences in ambiguous situations (Fulk, Schmitz, and Steinfield, (1990),
pp. 121-125). And aldermen often have to work in relatively ambiguous situations. Apart from
socialization effects that relate to all aldermen, there may be specific social influences within
subgroups of aldermen (see Schein (1997), pp. 13-14).
Findings of earlier research indicate that many politicians – a specific group of
information users - make little use of the available ‘standard’ performance information (Ter Bogt
(2001); see also Bowerman and Hutchinson (1998), pp. 305-307; Van Helden (1998a), pp. 68-69
and 95-96; Jansen (2000), pp. 185-215). Aldermen’s (formal) support to the introduction of
output-oriented planning and control might represent ‘ritualistic responses to the need to appear
competent, intelligent, legitimate, and rational’, which indicate that they respond to social
influences and expectations (Trevino, Daft, and Lengel (1990), p. 85; see also Staw (1990), pp.
77-79; Humphrey, Miller and Scapens (1993); Miller (1994)).
Another interesting socialization aspect of information use has to do with the rank of
managers. Donabedian, McKinnon and Bruns ((1998), pp. 380-381 and 390) have found that
managers’ preference for rich information increases when they rise in rank and that task
complexity is not the only explanation for this increase. They speculate that managers also like
rich information because it enables them, for example, to assert dominance and negotiate
conflicts.
The above presented, more general socialization aspects that may influence all aldermen, were
not researched in the survey. However, apart from such general influences, aldermen might
experience social influences that relate to the specific subgroups to which they belong. The
possible social influences within two subgroups of aldermen were briefly examined: political
party membership and the position of alderman responsible for the policy field of finance.
Schools of thought – and the conclusions from empirical research – on the role of partisan
politics on the behaviour of politicians and in shaping public policy are divergent. With respect to
the level of public spending, for example, the ‘non-partisanship school’ suggests that influences
of ideology and political parties are only marginal. However, the ‘partisan politics approach’
attributes important influences to ideological preferences of political parties (Cusack (1997), pp.
376-377). For both approaches some empirical evidence has been found (see e.g. Rose, (1980),
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degree of uncertainty depends on variety in conversion processes (i.e. frequence with which
information.
3b. Given that the relationship between an alderman’s specific position and his or her use of
information is unclear, it is supposed that an alderman for finance’s opinions on and use of
various sources of information are similar to other aldermen’s.
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Besides characteristics of outputs and transformation processes and social influences, situational
factors can play a part in people’s use of information sources. Situational factors include, for
example, personality and other individual characteristics, sufficient knowledge, hardware and
software in an organization, size and structure of an organization, accessibility of information,
and training in the use of certain media (Fulk, Schmitz, and Steinfield (1990), pp. 126). Aspects
like cognitive attitude and tolerance of ambiguity (see e.g. Dermer (1973); McGhee, Shields, and
Birnberg (1978)) were not included in the survey, because the questionnaire would have dealt
with too widely divergent subjects.
Two specific elements of situational factors were included in the survey. The first
element considered is gender, an aspect of individuals. There is a large body of literature on the
role of gender in the management of organizations and in management styles. Opinions differ on
the influence of gender. Authors who use the ‘equity approach’, for example, suppose that men
and women have identical capabilities in the field of management and organization. However,
authors who adopt the ‘complementary contribution approach’ are of the opinion that ‘typical’
male and female managers differ in their personal characteristics and management styles. This
approach suggests that there are small, but significant differences between men and women, and
that women possess complementary qualifications. Women can therefore make different, but
equally valuable contributions to the management of an organization (Grant (1987), pp. 57-62;
Welsh (1992), pp. 121-126 and 129; Adler (1994), pp. 606-608; Alvesson and Due Billing
(1997), pp. 153-154, 161). In the complementary contribution approach, values associated with
women are, for example, flexibility, social skills, nurturing, human relations, democratic attitude,
and team orientation. Male managers are associated with, for example, being technocratically
rational, competitive, just, and firm. Such differences may influence the use of certain sources of
information. They would also explain why female managers are well represented in managerial
jobs in which people and human relations are of central importance, while male managers are
dominantly active in areas such as production, finance and strategic management (Alvesson and
Due Billing (1997), pp. 162-165; see also Jablin and Sias (2001), p. 851). Because of the
relationship that may exist between information use and policy fields, it is interesting to check
also for a relationship between gender and policy fields.
If the complementary contribution theory holds in politically governed organizations and
among politicians, its consequences could be apparent in aldermen’s use of information sources
and portfolios, i.e. the policy fields for which they are responsible. Male aldermen would
relatively often hold portfolios relating to ‘production and finance’, i.e. such portfolios as finance,
public works and refuse collection. Female aldermen would relatively often be responsible for
policy fields relating to ‘people and human relations’, i.e. hold such portfolios as education, social
security, health care, welfare and culture. In addition, male and female aldermen would probably
differ in their opinions on and use of sources of performance information. If ‘technocratical
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rationality’ were a characteristic of male managers, they would probably have a relatively strong
liking for formal, quantitative and written information on performances, whilst female aldermen
might prefer face-to-face information.
Obviously, different opinions on the influence of gender on management and
organization can be found in the literature on gender. However, it is not really clear whether
female aldermen have a ‘special contribution’ with respect to information use and portfolios. It is
therefore assumed for the present that there are no differences between male and female
aldermen. In fact, especially as far as gender is concerned, the findings of the survey should be
regarded as being descriptive in nature.
These thoughts on gender have resulted in a fourth proposition, which is made up by two
sub-propositions:
4a. Male and female aldermen probably do not differ in their opinions on and use of various
sources of information, i.e. these opinions and use are not influenced by gender.
4b. Male and female aldermen probably do not differ in terms of the types of policy fields for
which they are responsible, i.e. gender does not determine the type of porftolio held by an
alderman.
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The second situational element which will be discussed briefly is the size of the municipal
organization, which is supposed to be closely related to municipality size. In the contingency
literature on organizations, management control and management accounting, organizational size
is considered to be an important variable which affects both the structure of and the forms of
control used in organizations (see e.g. Otley (1980); Emmanuel, Otley and Merchant (1991), pp.
63-64; Drury (2000), p.653; Donaldson (2001), pp. 61-81).
Bjørnenak, for example, has found that large profit organizations adopted the
sophisticated accounting instrument ‘Activity-Based Costing’ more often than small companies.
He presents evidence that relatively large organizations have more knowledge of this accounting
innovation, i.e. more access to and use of relevant sources of information (Bjørnenak (1997), pp.
14-15; see also Innes and Mitchell (1995), pp. 141-142). It seems that relatively large
organizations generally have more resources to develop innovative systems than smaller ones. It
is therefore also likely that these organizations will be able to develop more sophisticated
financial management. This might imply that they have more possibilities of employing well-
educated, experienced financial management employees and of implementing more advanced
costing and other financial management systems (see Drury (2000), p. 653; see also Van Loon,
1993).
As far as municipalities and NPM are concerned, this could mean that in relatively large
municipalities there are more possibilities of introducing ‘well-developed’ planning and control
reports, and performance indicators. And this could mean that aldermen of these municipalities
often consider these documents to be a helpful information source.
Perhaps there is also a relationship between the size of an organization and the types of
control applied by the management. When an organization grows, it can change its structure. A
unitary, functionally organized structure can be changed into a more decentralized one in order
that the organization can cope with an increasing number of complexities and uncertainties
coming from various environments (and also with its increasing size and complex information
flow). The top management of large organizations cannot recognize and monitor all essential
activities and environments itself (see also Ezzamel, Lilley and Willmott (1997), pp. 450-457;
Simons (2000), pp. 53-55). In such organizations there are not many possibilities of personal
contacts between the top management and employees, and of direct supervision of employees by
the top management.
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Decentralization does not mean that top management does not want to control essential
activities and performances anymore. However, it can be necessary to use means that differ from
the ones used in a small organization. In large, decentralized organizations indirect and more
formal forms of control and sophisticated accounting instruments can be more important than
personal contacts and sources of informal information (Williamson (1970), pp. 170-173;
Khandwalla (1977), pp. 508-511; Mintzberg (1979), pp. 230-234; Macintosh (1985), pp. 142-146
and 228; Donaldson (2001), pp. 63-67).
It seems that in municipalities, too, the possibilities of direct and informal contacts
between aldermen and employees decrease when the size of an organization increases. This could
mean that aldermen of large municipalities more often consider formal, written control
documents, i.e. budget statements, management reports and policy notes, as important sources of
information (Van Helden (1998b), p. 93-94; see also Moret, Ernst & Young (1997), pp.106-110).
These thoughts have resulted in the fifth proposition, which is made up by two specific
sub-propositions:
5a. The larger the size of a municipality, the more sophisticated the performance information
in its planning and control documents, and the more aldermen will make use of these documents
and will regard these documents as a source of helpful information for their daily work.
5b. When the size of a municipality increases, aldermen will use sources of formal, written
information rather than sources of informal information.
Although aldermen’s use of information can be influenced by several other aspects, these will not
be discussed here. The discussion in this section – and the survey - focused on a limited number
of possibly interesting aspects of aldermen’s information use because only a few subjects can be
dealt with in a relatively brief questionnaire – which has its limitations, but usually also helps to
achieve a higher response rate (which is desirable to obtain a general picture). The exploration of
literature on control of organizations and managers’ use of information is now finished. The
survey research will be introduced in the next section.
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The best methods of research into such a complicated subject as the use of sources of information
are probably face-to-face, in-depth interviews and observation of behaviour. Face-to-face
interviews with aldermen were done in an earlier phase of research (Ter Bogt (2001)). However,
this method is very time-consuming, which means that only a limited number of people can be
interviewed. Although survey research has its limitations too, it was performed in order to gather
information about the opinions of a relatively large number of aldermen with different
characteristics who work in Dutch municipalities of different sizes.
The survey questionnaire which was developed was based on theory and the findings of
earlier exploratory case research in three large Dutch municipalities (Ter Bogt (2001)). A first
draft of the questionnaire was discussed with a number of aldermen who were not included in the
survey research. Their comments and suggestions were taken into account when the final
questionnaire was drawn up. This brief and simple questionnaire was sent by post to 698
aldermen of Dutch municipalities with 20,000 or more inhabitants. The questionnaires were
numbered and addressed to the aldermen personally. The names and addresses were taken from
the 2000 yearbook on municipalities published by the Association of Netherlands Municipalities
(‘Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten’; see VNG (2000)).
Municipalities with fewer than 20,000 inhabitants were not included in the survey. These
municipalities have relatively small organizations, in which there is usually not much distance
between aldermen and employees. In addition, these organizations have usually been
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decentralized to a limited extent. The aldermen probably make much use of personal contacts to
control the organizations (see also Moret, Ernst & Young (1997), pp. 18-21; Van Helden (1998b),
p. 93).
In January 1999 the Netherlands consisted of circa 520 municipalities. There were 206
municipalities with 20,000 or more inhabitants, 165 of which were included in the survey. All
aldermen of these 165 municipalities were included in the survey. The municipalities were
divided into three groups, according to size. The first group consisted of municipalities with
20,000 to 35,000 inhabitants (group I); 67 of the 108 municipalities in this group were included in
the survey. They were spread proportionally over the country. The second group consisted of 59
municipalities with 35,000 to 70,000 inhabitants (group II). All these municipalities and their
aldermen were included in the survey. The third group consisted of 39 municipalities with 70,000
or more inhabitants. These municipalities and their aldermen were all included in the survey
(group III).ˆ  Because with respect to municipal size the municipalities in group I are more
homogeneous than those in group II and especially group III, group I municipalities were only
partly included in the survey, whilst all municipalities in groups II and II were included.
Of the 698 questionnaires which were distributed, 286 were returned, which means that
the unadjusted response rate is 41%. These 286 questionnaires were returned by aldermen of 140
municipalities. Two mailings were sent out: one in July and an identical reminder in September
2000. They resulted in 262 usable responses, i.e. the final response rate was 37.5% (see table 1
for more details). The remaining 24 questionnaires had not been filled in, because the persons in
question did no longer work as an alderman or had only recently become an alderman and
thought that they did not have enough experience as an alderman to answer the questions.
Twenty-one questions in the questionnaire are of relevance to this paper (see Appendix A
for this part of the questionnaire). The respondents could answer sixteen questions by ticking
categories on a five-point Likert scale. The following information about the respondents was
taken from the municipal yearbook mentioned above: municipality size, political affiliations,
policy fields for which they were responsible, i.e. portfolios, and gender. Aldermen who thought
that only limited performance information was provided in their planning and control documents
did not have to answer the part of the questionnaire which contained questions about, for
example, the usefulness of this information for aldermen’s day-to-day work.
 The data were statistically analysed using SPSS. A Mann-Whitney test of the responses
of the July group and the September group showed that, at a significance level of 5% (p ( 0.05),
there were no differences between the responses of the groups of early and late responders. When
it is supposed that the answers of late responders more closely resemble those of non-
respondents, the absence of significant differences between early and late responders could imply
that there is no or limited influence of the non-respondents on the outcomes of the survey.
As with any survey, the respondents in this survey had to be ‘trusted on their word’. It
seems doubtful whether the aldermen in the survey are more stimulated to give ‘desirable
answers’ than other respondents in other surveys, the more because the aldermen knew from the
letter accompanying the questionnaire that the outcomes would be published anonymously.
However, in principle it is possible that the respondents’ answers are influenced by what they
think to be desirable answers. The answers to a large number of questions / variables showed that
the respondents seemed to be biased against ‘negative’ response categories, such as ‘little’ or
‘very little’ use of a certain source of information. The answers to most questions were therefore
recoded, i.e. the original five response categories were changed into three categories. The original
categories of ‘very little / not’, ‘little’ and ‘average’ were changed into one new category. A chi-
square analysis was carried out to determine the statistical significance of the links between some
variables.ˆ
The rather high response rate and the absence of significant differences between early and
late responders indicate that the survey results may be representative of the groups of
municipalities studied, especially because all aldermen of municipalities with 35,000 or more
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inhabitants were included in the survey. This does not mean, however, that the findings can be
generalized to smaller municipalities or municipalities in other countries.
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This section presents some basic information about the respondents’ characteristics which was
derived from the survey. These characteristics are relevant because most of them are ‘independent
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Information about the respondents’ gender was gathered from the municipal yearbook. On the
basis of this information, the respondents were divided into two ‘gender groups’: a group of male
respondents (group a) and a group of female respondents (group b) (see table 1).
The respondents were also divided into four ‘portfolio groups’ to enable an examination
of the idea that aldermen’s use of information could be influenced by the concreteness of their
tasks and the policy fields for which they are responsible (i.e. portfolios). The first group of
aldermen had a portfolio in which relatively concrete and measurable activities and outputs were
predominant. These aldermen (group 1) were primarily responsible for such policy fields as
public works, public transport, traffic routes, refuse collection, public housing, environmental
protection, urban renewal, and town planning. Of the 262 respondents, 80 were in this group (see
table 1). The second group (n = 54) was responsible for policy fields in which ‘intermediately’
concrete and measurable activities were performed. These aldermen were responsible for such
policy fields as social security, social renewal, public utilities, development of the economy and
tourism, provision of sheltered workshops for the handicapped, and employment policy (group 2).
The third group (n = 64) of aldermen had a portfolio in which activities and outputs with low
concreteness and low measurability were predominant. They were responsible for such policy
fields as education, welfare, young people and elderly people, social welfare, public health, equal
opportunities, media, sports, and culture (group 3). The fourth group of aldermen was responsible
for finance (group 4; n = 64). This group was not primarily formed on the basis of the
concreteness and measurability of the activities and outputs in the aldermen’s portfolio. The
finance aldermen were separated from the others because they might play specific roles and hold
specific opinions with respect to planning and control documents, output-orientedness and
performance information.
In the Netherlands, aldermen are elected by members of the municipal council. Four
groups of political parties are distinguished in the survey (‘political party groups’). The first three
‘groups’ consist of the three biggest national parties: the social-democrats (group A), the liberals /
conservatives (group B), and the christian-democrats (group C). These three national parties
dominate many municipal councils, especially in relatively large municipalities. A few relatively
small national parties, too, are represented in several municipal councils. The fourth group of
political parties consists of the remaining political parties, i.e. smaller national and local parties
(group D). Group 4 consists of 66 aldermen, 35 of whom represent local parties. There are several
local parties in the Netherlands, especially in relatively small municipalities. A local party is
usually active in only one municipality.
The respondents’ experience as an alderman varied widely: it ranged from 1 to 21 years
(in rounded figures). Because in most Dutch municipalities there were elections just over two
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years before the survey (and the elections preceding those elections were just over six years ago),
the number of aldermen with 3 or 4 years of experience is relatively limited. Three ‘experience
groups’ are mentioned in table 1. The first group consists of aldermen who are relatively
unexperienced (( 2 years of experience). The second group consists of intermediately experienced
aldermen (3-4 years) and the third group consists of highly experienced aldermen (( 5 years).
Table 1 contains basic information about the respondents’ characteristics which was derived from
the survey, i.e. information about party membership, municipality size, portfolio, and years of
experience.
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One of the aims of the survey was to explore and describe Dutch aldermen’s opinions on
performance information in planning and control documents and their use of various sources of
information. The respondents’ opinions on these subjects will be summarized in this section.
Of the 262 respondents, 118 (45%) indicated that their municipalities – at least the
departments they are primarily responsible for - present ‘many’ or ‘very many’ performance
indicators in their planning and control documents. Only respondents who gave these answers had
to answer a number of subsequent questions in the questionnaire. However, these questions about
quality aspects and the use of planning and control information were answered by more than 118
aldermen, namely 158 aldermen. These 158 persons were mostly aldermen of municipalities
whose planning and control documents contained a relatively large amount of performance
information.
A group of 122 aldermen indicated how long their municipalities’ budgets had contained
output-oriented performance indicators; 36 respondents did not mention a number of years. These
122 aldermen mostly worked for municipalities which seemed to be rather experienced in using
performance indicators. Almost 79% of them indicated that performance information had been
included for three years or more (almost 37% had done this for five years or more).
Of the group of 158 aldermen, 22% answered that information on costs of products was
included in ‘many’ or ‘very many’ cases. About 41% said that in ‘many’ or ‘almost all’ cases the
annual report gave an account of the intended performances which were mentioned in the budget.
Almost 64% of this group of 158 respondents ‘agreed’ or ‘strongly agreed’ that output-
oriented performance indicators in budgets were to a very large extent standard information
which could be dealt with by a municipality’s civil servants. Only if this kind of information
concerned new policies or politically sensitive matters, would aldermen deal with it personally. A
statistical analysis showed that aldermen who ‘agreed’ or ‘strongly agreed’ that performance
indicators in budgets were largely standard information indicated significantly less frequently that
they used performance information in budgets and annual reports ‘often’ or ‘very often’ ((2 =
9.75, df 2, p = 0.008). This group of aldermen also indicated significantly more frequently that
the amount of cost information in budgets was ‘low’ or ‘very low’.
Once budgets had been drawn up, about 11% of the 158 aldermen used the performance
information in the budgets ‘often’ or ‘very often’. About 30% thought that performance
information in budgets and other planning and control reports, such as annual reports and
management reports, was ‘important’ or ‘very important’ for their day-to-day work.
Of course these percentages relate only to the group of 158 aldermen who answered the
questions mentioned above. The 104 aldermen who did not answer these questions might hold
‘negative’ opinions on the quality of performance information and the use of planning and control
documents. Their municipalities - at least the departments they were responsible for - did not
produce much performance information.
The survey does not show how many of these 104 aldermen really held ‘negative’
opinions on the quality of planning and control documents (i.e. output-orientedness) and the use
of available performance information. However, if most of them did, it could probably be
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assumed that not more than about 20% of the whole group of 262 aldermen considered
information in planning and control documents to be important for their day-to-day work. About
7% of the aldermen used performance information regularly, once budgets had been drawn up.
Not more than about 20-25% of the 262 aldermen personally saw to it which performance
information was included in budgets. These 20-25% did not think that performance information
was standard information which could be dealt with by civil servants. To conclude, most
aldermen indicated that performance and output information in planning and control documents
was of rather low quality and that they made limited use of this information.
Next, all aldermen were asked to indicate which sources of information they used to assess
developments and performances in the organizational units they were responsible for. Almost all
of the 262 respondents provided answers to each of the questions (see table 2).
Most aldermen used informal verbal consultations with official top managers, i.e. civil
servants. Almost 82% of the 262 aldermen indicated that they used this source of performance
information ‘often’ or ‘very often’; 2.3% indicated that they made ‘little’ or ‘very little / no’ use
of this source of information. Formal meetings and consultations with official top managers were
also an ‘important’ or ‘very important’ source of information for many aldermen (i.e. 79%).
Information from budgets and annual reports was ‘important’ or ‘very important’ to 42% and
information from management reports was ‘important’ or ‘very important’ to 45% of the
aldermen. The groups of aldermen who made ‘average’ use of budgets / annual reports and
management reports were relatively large: 45% and almost 39% aldermen respectively. Table 2
contains more information on the aldermen’s use of sources of information. The various
information sources which were added by 11 aldermen, are not included in table 2.
It seems that the aldermen’s experience did not have a significant influence on their
opinions on the amount and quality of performance information in planning and control
documents, the meaning of such information for their day-to-day work, and their use of different
sources of performance information. A chi-square analysis of these variables showed no
statistically significant differences between the answers of the three ‘experience groups’.
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The findings presented in table 2 seem to confirm the views of such authors as Daft, Lengel,
MacIntosh, and Mintzberg (see section 3). They say that top managers – e.g. aldermen – often
prefer ‘rich’ information, especially information provided in face-to-face encounters. The
informal, verbal consultations and formal meetings mentioned in table 2 are sources of rich
information. Signals from citizens, companies, local interest groups, and members of the
municipal council are probably sources of ‘moderately rich’ information. Aldermen make much
use of informal and formal information provided by official top managers. They make much less
use of formal, numeric information (e.g. information in budgets, annual reports and management
reports) and formal, written information (e.g. policy notes).
Section 5.3 describes how different groups of aldermen differ in their opinions on and use
of sources of information.
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On the basis of the general propositions in section 3, the links between several specific variables
and such groups as portfolio groups, municipality size groups, and gender groups will be
statistically analysed in this section. Because of the brevity of the questionnaire, no ‘in-depth
findings’ can be presented here. However, the findings may be relevant with respect to the third
aim of this paper: give tentative indications of evidence regarding the general propositions and of
interesting aspects for further research.
	

According to proposition 1, aldermen are more inclined to use output-oriented types of control
and formal output information when the tasks in the policy fields for which they are responsible
are relatively concrete, outputs are measurable and the aldermen have a good knowledge of
transformation processes. This section about proposition 1 examines the degree of statistical
support for some specific relationships between aldermen’s portfolios (portfolio groups) and
variables on information use.
In section 5.1 four portfolio groups of aldermen were distinguished (groups 1, 2, 3 and 4).
Group 1 (public works, etc) was considered to be the group with the most concrete tasks, quite
measurable outputs, and the best understanding of transformation processes. Group 2 (social
security, etc) was the group with intermediately concrete tasks, intermediate measurability and
understanding. Group 3 (education, etc) was the group with the least concrete tasks, measurability
and understanding. Group 4 (finance) was formed because of the special role of finance aldermen.
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First, the opinions of the aldermen in the different portfolio groups on the relevance of
available performance information to their day-to-day work will be discussed. In each of the four
groups, about 30% of the aldermen used this information ‘often’ or ‘very often’. However, about
90% of each group said it was not possible to evaluate performances mainly on the basis of
performance information in various planning and control documents..
The four groups of aldermen held quite divergent opinions on the question of whether
performance information in budgets is mainly standard information which can be dealt with by
civil servants. In group 1, 82% of the aldermen said that they ‘agreed’ or ‘strongly agreed’ with
this statement; 57% of group 2 and 47% of group 3 said the same (in group 4: almost 67%). It
seems that aldermen with more concrete and measurable policy fields and with more knowledge
of transformation processes are less involved in drawing up output-oriented performances in
budgets. This relationship is statistically significant at a 5% level. So, when production processes
and outputs are more measurable, more standard and less uncertain, they seem to be more suitable
for decentralized, output-oriented forms of control. These findings offer tentative support for
proposition 1.
Next, the relationship between type of portfolio group and use of performance
information in budgets and annual reports will be discussed. An analysis has shown that there is a
statistically significant relationship between these two variables. However, the aldermen in group
1 and those in group 3 used performance information from budgets and annual reports to a similar
degree; 33% of group 1 and 36% of group 3 said that they used this information ‘often’ or ‘very
often’. Of the aldermen in group 2, 50% used this information ‘often’ or ‘very often’. This means
that formal performance information in budgets and annual reports is used the most by aldermen
who are responsible for intermediately concrete and measurable activities and outputs. Although
there seems to be partial support, these findings are not completely in line with the expectations
formulated in proposition 1.
Management reports are another source of formal information on performances and other
planning and control aspects. An analysis has shown that there is no statistically significant
relationship between type of portfolio group and the frequency of aldermen’s use of this source of
information. About 50% of the aldermen in each of the groups 1, 2, and 4, and only 32% of group
3 indicated that they used performance information in management reports ‘often’ or ‘very often’.
These findings do not really offer support for proposition 1.
On the whole, there is some evidence to support proposition 1. Most aldermen seem to
hold the opinion that policy fields with relatively low uncertainty and standard, measurable
outputs, are more suitable for decentralization and output-oriented control types. However, a
higher degree of measurability of the outputs in aldermen’s portfolios does not always imply that
they make more use of performance information in planning and control documents.
	
Table 2 shows that most aldermen made relatively much use of rich performance information
which was provided by official top managers during face-to-face encounters (i.e. informal, verbal
consultations with top managers and formal meetings with top managers). The aldermen made far
less use of numeric and formal, written information in budgets, annual reports, management
reports, and policy notes. Not all sources of rich information were frequently used. This was not
the case, for example, for informal, verbal consultations with ‘other’ civil servants. However, in
general, these findings seem to support proposition 2a.
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Proposition 2b suggests that the portfolio groups of aldermen use rich information in
different degrees. According to this proposition, less knowledge of transformation processes, less
measurable outputs and more uncertainty mean that aldermen make more use of rich information.
First, the link between type of portfolio group and aldermen’s use of informal information
provided by official top managers will be discussed. In group 1 (public works, etc), 46% of the
aldermen ‘very often’ used informal information provided by official top managers. About 30-
35% of the aldermen in the other groups used this information ‘very often’. However, these
percentages seem to have switched places in the answer category of ‘often’, because about 45-
50% of the aldermen in groups 2, 3, and 4 and almost 38% of group 1 said that they ‘often’ used
this information. Although it seems that the aldermen in the portfolio group 1 made somewhat
more use of informal information provided by official top managers than the aldermen in the
other portfolio groups, the differences are not statistically significant.
The aldermen in group 1 indicated more frequently that they used information from
formal meetings and consultations with official top managers ‘often’ or ‘very often’. About 85%
of these aldermen ticked these two categories. Between 75% and 80% of the aldermen in the
other groups ticked these two categories. However, the differences are not statistically significant.
Although the findings were statistically insignificant, it seems that, on the whole,
informal information provided by top managers was used the most by aldermen who were
responsible for the most concrete and least uncertain policy fields. These findings do not offer
any support for proposition 2b.
It also seems that the aldermen do not differ significantly in their use of information from
local news media and signals and questions from members of the municipal council, i.e. two
‘moderately rich’ information sources. However, the aldermen do differ significantly in their use
of signals from and consultations with citizens, companies, and neighbourhood and local interest
groups, i.e. other sources of ‘moderately rich’ information. About 65-70% of the aldermen in
group 1 (public works, etc) and group 3 (education, etc) said that they used information from
these sources ‘often’ or ‘very often’. About 55% of the aldermen in group 2 and about 40% of the
aldermen in group 4 said the same. At a 5% level, these differences are statistically significant ((2
= 16.98, df 6, p = 0.009). Leaving group 4 aside, it seems that these differences are not consistent
with the relationships described in proposition 2b. The differences probably are due to the fact
that some groups of aldermen have to have more contact with the general public because of the
character of their portfolios (a politician could, of course, consider such contacts as a certain
source of uncertainty).
The use that aldermen make of informal, verbal consultations and formal meetings with
other civil servants offers moderate support for proposition 2b. Before these two variables were
analysed, the original five answer categories were changed into only two categories, i.e. ‘often’
and ‘very often’ became one category. As regards aldermen’s use of informal, verbal information
provided by other civil servants, 40.5% of the aldermen in group 1 ticked the combined category
of ‘often and very often’. In group 2, 44.4% ticked this category and in group 3, 59.7%. These
differences are only significant at a 10% level ((2 = 5.43, df 2, p = 0.066). The aldermen in group
3 also said more frequently that they used information from formal meetings with other civil
servants ‘often and very often’ (group 3: 38.3%; group 2: 24.1%; group 1: 23.1%). However,
these differences are not statistically significant, even at a 10% level ((2 = 4.515, df 2, p = 0.105).
On the whole, it seems that there is little evidence to support proposition 2b. In general,
aldermen seem to prefer sources of rich performance information (see proposition 2a). However,
there are few significant differences between the different portfolio groups of aldermen (see
proposition 2b).
	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In proposition 3a, no relationship is specified, but attention is drawn to the possible influence of
such aspects as ideals and internal culture of political parties on aldermen’s use of sources of
information. In proposition 3b, too, no relationship is specified. This proposition is concerned
with aldermen for finance’s use of performance information from planning and control
documents and their opinions on the relevance of these documents.
In section 5.1, Dutch political parties were divided into group A (social-democrats),
group B (liberals / conservatives), group C (christian-democrats), and group D (other parties,
including local parties).
A statistical analysis of the respondents’ opinions on such aspects as amount of
performance information in budgets and relevance of such information to their work has shown
that there are no significant differences between the four political party groups. However, the
aldermen in group B seemed to be slightly more critical of the outcomes of the introduction of
performance indicators than the aldermen from other political parties. In group B, 65% of the
aldermen said that their municipal budgets contained ‘average, little, or very little’ performance
information. About 50-55% of the other groups said the same. The groups responded similarly to
a question about the inclusion of cost information in budgets. Probably, there is a relationship
between the somewhat more critical opinions of group B aldermen and the fact that they were
more often responsible for finance than the aldermen in the other political party groups (about
36% of group B; 18-24% of the other groups).
There are also no statistically significant differences between the aldermen from different
parties as far as their use of various sources of information is concerned. This does not mean that
there are no differences at all. For example, the aldermen in group C and in group A indicated
more frequently that they used information from informal, verbal consultations and formal
meetings with official top managers ‘often’ or ‘very often’. The opposite is true for their use of
performance information in budgets and annual reports. The aldermen in group D (other parties,
including local parties) made somewhat more use of signals from and consultations with citizens,
companies, and neighbourhood and local interest groups. Almost 67% of this group used this
source of information ‘often’ or ‘very often’; between 52% and 60% of the other groups said the
same.5
The above statistical analysis of differences between aldermen from different political
parties as regards their use of information is mainly exploratory and descriptive by nature.
Although there are some differences between the four political party groups with respect to
opinions on and use of performance information, the differences are not statistically significant. It
seems that the findings with respect to proposition 3a do not give clear indications for further
research neither.
Proposition 3b is specifically concerned with aldermen for finance (group 4). In many respects,
there are no statistically significant differences between the opinions of, on the one hand, finance
aldermen (group 4) and, on the other hand, all other aldermen included in the survey. However,
37.5% of the finance aldermen indicated that, in their opinion, the amount of performance
information in planning and control documents was ‘high’ of ‘very high’, while 47.5% of the
other aldermen said the same. Aldermen for finance also seemed to be more critical of the amount
of cost information in budgets; 15% said it was ‘high’ or ‘very high’ and 24% of all other
aldermen said the same (statistically insignificant). The groups of aldermen held significantly
different opinions on the degree to which the annual report gave an account of the intended
performances which were mentioned in the budget. About 24% of the finance aldermen thought
that ‘many’ or ‘very many’ of the intended performances were accounted for in the annual report,
while more than 46% of all other aldermen said the same ((2 = 5.19, df 1, p = 0.023).
The finance aldermen and other aldermen also differ in their use of information sources.
At a 5% level, there are statistically significant differences between the groups of aldermen with
respect to their use of performance information from budgets and annual reports. More than 57%
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of the finance aldermen ticked ‘high’ or ‘very high’ use of this information source. Almost 39%
of all other aldermen did the same ((2 = 7.27, df 2, p = 0.026). The higher use may be directly
related to finance aldermen’s specific tasks in a municipal organization. They probably have to
use information from planning and control documents more often, for example when they prepare
discussions with other aldermen or civil servants on additional financial budgets.
There is also a statistically significant difference between the groups of aldermen with
respect to their use of signals from and consultations with citizens, companies, and
neighbourhood and local interest groups. About 41% of the finance aldermen indicated a ‘high’
or ‘very high’ use, while 64% of all other aldermen did the same ((2 = 11.06, df 2, p = 0.004).
Moreover, at the 5% level there were statistically significant differences between the groups of
aldermen with regard to their use of signals and questions from members of the municipal
council. Aldermen for finance used such information less frequently. In both cases, these
differences may relate to the more internally oriented and less ‘political’ character of aldermen
for finance’s tasks.6
On the whole, finance aldermen and other aldermen differ slightly in their use of some
sources of information (proposition 3b). It is unclear whether social influences and ‘group
compliance’ play any role. Finance aldermen relatively frequently use performance information
in planning and control documents, whilst their use of some other, ‘moderately rich’ sources of
information is relatively low. These differences may relate to their specific tasks and roles.
However, aldermen for finance do not try to ‘defend’ results as far as output-orientedness is
concerned. On the contrary, they seem to be more critical of these results than other aldermen.
	
Proposition 4a focuses on the question of whether there is a relationship between gender and use
of performance information. Proposition 4b brings up whether there is a relationship between an
alderman’s gender and portfolio, i.e. the policy fields for which he / she is responsible. If the
findings of the survey should point to these relationships, the differences between the male
aldermen (group a) and the female aldermen (group b) as regards their use of information could
be due to their portfolios, rather than their gender. The following analysis of the possible effects
of gender mentioned in proposition 4 is exploratory and descriptive by nature.
An analysis of the survey findings has shown that there is a statistically significant
relationship between an alderman’s gender and portfolio ((2 = 12.23, df 3, p = 0.007). Portfolio
group 3 (education, etc) has the highest percentage of female aldermen (32.8%). Portfolio group 2
(social security, etc) has 24.1% female aldermen; portfolio group 1 has 16.3% female aldermen
and group 4 has 9.4% female aldermen.7 As has been shown in the statistical analysis of variables
in proposition 2, there are some differences between the aldermen in the different portfolio
groups as far as their use of information is concerned. However, only a few of these differences
are statistically significant.
Various variables were analysed in order to determine female and male aldermen’s
opinions on and use of information.8 The analysis shows that female aldermen hold more
‘positive’ opinions on some aspects of planning and control documents than male aldermen.
Statistically significant are e.g. the differences between their opinions on the amount of output-
oriented performance information in budgets ((2 = 7.96, df 1, p = 0.005), the degree to which cost
information is included in budgets ((2 = 5.80, df 1, p = 0.016), and the degree to which annual
reports account for intended performances mentioned in budgets ((2 = 4.74, df 1, p = 0.029). On
the other hand, although statistically insignificant, the female aldermen seemed to be somewhat
less appreciative of the performance information in planning and control documents than the male
aldermen. For example, only about 5% of the female aldermen said that they used performance
information ‘often’ or ‘very often’; among male aldermen this was 14%. Almost 26% of the
female aldermen thought that performance information in planning and control documents was
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‘important’ or ‘very important’ to their day-to-day work; 32% of the male aldermen said the
same.
There were some slight differences between male and female aldermen as regards the
sources of information they use. They used formal information in budgets, annual reports and
management reports with more or less the same frequency. About 40-46% of the male and female
aldermen said that they used such information ‘often’ or ‘very often’. Male aldermen made
slightly more use of informal information provided by official top managers. About 84% of the
male aldermen used it ‘often and very often’; 74% of the female aldermen said the same. These
differences were not significant at a 5% level, but they were at a 10% level ((2 = 2.91, df 1, p =
0.088). However, information from formal meetings and consultations with top managers, also a
source of face-to-face information, was used more frequently by female aldermen. About 89% of
the female aldermen used this information source ‘often’ or ‘very often’, whilst this was 77%
among male aldermen. This difference also is significant at a 10% level ((2 = 3.42, df 1, p =
0.064). Although insignificant, even at a 10% level, similar pictures arise for male and female
aldermen’s frequency of informal and formal consultations with other employees.
The findings of the survey show that male and female aldermen differ significantly in
terms of the policy fields for which are responsible (proposition 4b). However, the relationship
between these ‘gender-related’ differences and male and female aldermen’s use of information is
not clear. Female aldermen seem to hold slightly more ‘positive’ opinions on ‘technical’ aspects
of planning and control documents, such as the amount of performance information which is
included. However, they seem to be slightly less appreciative of the available information than
male aldermen. There are some differences between male and female aldermen as far as their use
of sources of information is concerned (proposition 4a). Both male and female aldermen highly
appreciate informal and formal (face-to-face) information from official top managers. However,
male aldermen showed a slightly stronger preference for informal consultations with official top
managers (and other employees), whilst female aldermen seemed to prefer formal meetings and
consultations.
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In proposition 5, attention is drawn to municipality size. In section 4, three classes of
municipalities were distinguished (20,000 ( 35,000 inhabitants: group I; 35,000 ( 70,000
inhabitants: group II; ( 70,000 inhabitants: group III). Proposition 5a suggests that relatively large
municipalities have more sophisticated planning and control documents and performance
information, and that aldermen of relatively large municipalities therefore hold more ‘positive’
opinions on these documents. Proposition 5b suggests that aldermen of relatively large
municipalities make more use of or have to make more use of sources of formal, written
information.
The survey findings show that there are some differences between the aldermen from the
different classes of municipalities mentioned above. For example, in each class, a different
percentage of aldermen said that separate budgets were drawn up for municipal departments, in
addition to the budget for the whole organization (significant at a 5% level; (2 = 38.19, df 2, p =
0.000). The percentage of aldermen mentioned above is 98.8% in group III, 78.8% in group II,
and 60.6% in group I. This indicates that larger municipalities more often have separate budgets
for their departments. As for the amount of performance information in budgets, there is a clear
difference between the large municipalities in group III and the municipalities in groups I and II.
The amount was ‘high’ or ‘very high’, according to 53% of the aldermen in group III and about
41% of the aldermen in groups I and II. A relatively high percentage of the aldermen in group I
(18%) indicated that their budgets contained a ‘low’ or ’very low’ amount of performance
information. These differences are statistically significant ((2 = 12.27, df 4, p = 0.015). It seems
that relatively large municipalities more often introduce a high amount of performance indicators.
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However, among the municipalities which had introduced a high or very high amount of
performance information, relatively small municipalities most frequently included a ‘high and
very high’ amount of cost information in their budgets ((2 = 8.41, df 2, p = 0.015). The amount
was ‘high’ or ‘very high’, according to 36% of the aldermen in group I, 14% in group II, and 16%
in group III. Moreover, among the municipalities with a high amount of performance information
in their budgets, the aldermen in groups I and II more frequently indicated that performance
information in planning and control documents was ‘important and very important’ to their daily
work. These categories were ticked by about 35% of the aldermen in these two groups and by
21% of the aldermen in group III (differences only significant at a 10% level; (2 = 3.43, df 1, p =
0.064).
The aldermen in the three size classes also differ slightly in their use of information
sources. At a 10% significance level, the aldermen differ in the frequency with which they use
informal information provided by official top managers ((2 = 8.85, df 4, p = 0.065). These
findings seem to tentatively confirm the relationship expected in proposition 5b, in that aldermen
in the largest class of municipalities used informal information provided by top managers the
least. This type of information was used ‘often’ or ‘very often’ by 73.5% of the aldermen in
group III and 89.4% of the aldermen in group II. However, in group I this percentage was lower
than in group II: 81.9% of the group I aldermen used this information source ‘often’ or ‘very
often’. The three groups hardly differ in the use of informal performance information provided by
other civil servants. The same is true for two other more or less informal information sources, i.e.
signals from and consultations with citizens, companies, and neighbourhood and local interest
groups, and signals and questions from members of the municipal council.
Next, the aldermen’s use of three different sources of formal, written performance
information will be discussed. The aldermen in the three classes of municipalities do not differ
significantly in their use of information from management reports. However, compared with
groups I and II combined, the percentage of aldermen which ‘often and very often’ used
performance information from budgets and annual reports was lower in the relatively large group
III municipalities (about 48% in groups I and II, 32.9% in group III; significant at a 5% level; (2 =
5.20, df 1, p = 0.023). The aldermen in the three classes of municipalities also differ in their use
of information from the third source of formal, written information, i.e. reports from civil servants
and policy notes. These differences are statistically significant at a 10% level ((2 = 7.88, df 4, p =
0.100). The aldermen in group I said most frequently that they used this source of information
‘often’ or ‘very often’ (74.5%, n = 94); 60.2% of the aldermen in group II (n = 84) and 58.5% in
group III (n = 82) said the same.
Compared with groups I and II, the aldermen in group III made more frequent use of
information from formal meetings and consultations with official top managers (statistically
significant at a 5% level; (2 = 9.82, df 2, p = 0.007). Compared with groups I and II, the aldermen
in group III also made significantly more frequent use of information from formal meetings and
consultations with other civil servants ((2 = 4.25, df 1, p = 0.039). This indicates that aldermen in
larger municipalities relatively frequently use formal face-to-face information. Strictly speaking
there is no support for the relationship suggested in proposition 5b; aldermen in larger
municipalities do not more often use formal, written performance information. However, they
relatively frequently use other sources of formal information, whilst their use of informal
information from official top managers is relatively low.
On the whole, it seems that large municipalities include more output-oriented
performance information in their planning and control documents (proposition 5a). However, the
aldermen of relatively small municipalities with such information in their planning and control
documents seem to be more satisfied with it, seeing that they use it more frequently. Differences
in the use of various sources of information mainly seem to relate to, on the one hand, aldermen
in groups I and II, and, on the other hand, aldermen in group III municipalities. Aldermen of
relatively small municipalities equally or somewhat more often use sources of informal
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information, while they use sources of formal, written information more frequently than aldermen
of larger municipalities. Although their use of formal planning and control information and policy
notes is relatively low, aldermen in larger municipalities frequently use other formal information
sources, i.e. face-to-face meetings with managers and other civil servants.
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After a theoretical overview of factors which could influence aldermen’s use of information, this
paper presented some findings of survey research on 262 aldermen of 140 Dutch municipalities
with 20,000 or more inhabitants. The findings of the survey indicated that many respondents
considered the output-orientedness of planning and control documents to be far from perfect.
Moreover, many aldermen hardly appreciated the output-oriented information on developments
and performances that was available in their organizations or they hardly used it.
The sources of performance information of which most aldermen made by far the most
use were informal, verbal consultations and formal meetings with top managers, i.e. civil
servants. The aldermen also relatively often used formal, written information from reports by
civil servants and from policy notes. They made much less use of formal, written information in
budgets, annual reports, and management reports, and other sources of formal and informal
information. It seems that planning and control reports hardly meet the needs and hardly reflect
the preferences of elected politicians like aldermen.
Although certain characteristics probably can influence aldermen’s opinions on and use
of various sources of performance information, a statistical analysis of the findings of the survey
yielded mixed outcomes.
It seems aldermen are the opinion that production processes and outputs which are more
measurable, more standard and less uncertain, are more suitable for decentralized, output-oriented
control types. However, the relationship between the major policy fields in aldermen’s portfolios
and their use of performance information is not straightforward. Aldermen with more concrete
and more highly measurable tasks in their portfolio, do not always make a more frequent use of
formal performance information in planning and control documents (proposition 1). Neither is
there a clear relationship between, on the one hand, measurability of outputs and uncertainty in
policy fields (i.e. portfolio groups) and, on the other hand, aldermen’s use of ‘rich’ information,
i.e. informal, verbal information provided in face-to-face encounters (proposition 2b). Higher
uncertainty and lower measurability of outputs do not always imply that aldermen more
frequently use rich information. Aldermen in the four portfolio groups most frequently used
informal information provided by official top managers.
These findings indicate that other factors than knowledge of transformation processes,
measurability of outputs and uncertainty of policy fields, influence aldermen’s use of formal
planning and control information and sources of rich information. In general, all aldermen seem
to prefer rich, verbal information to sources of written information, probably because they work
in a relatively complex and uncertain political environment (proposition 2a).
Besides the possible influence of ‘technical’ characteristics of production processes and
outputs on aldermen’s use of information, a number of other factors were examined. These
analyses were mostly exploratory and descriptive by nature. They indicate, for example, that there
is a limited relationship between the political parties of which aldermen are a member and their
opinions on sources of performance information (proposition 3a). Liberal / conservative aldermen
seem to be slightly more critical of the quality of output information in planning and control
documents. It is unclear, however, whether differences in ideals and culture play a part in such
differences between aldermen from various parties.
Aldermen for finance, who are responsible for planning and control documents, are less
appreciative of planning and control documents in their municipality than aldermen who hold
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other portfolios. Finance aldermen also differed somewhat in their use of various sources of
information; e.g. they relatively frequently use planning and control information (proposition 3b).
However, such differences in use of information may mainly relate to their specific task in the
municipal organization and not so much to ‘social influences’.
Male and female aldermen differ significantly in terms of the portfolios which they hold,
i.e. the policy fields for which they are responsible (proposition 4b). Although female aldermen
hold relatively ‘positive’ opinions on technical characteristics of planning and control documents,
they seems to be less appreciative of the available performance information than male aldermen.
There are also some differences between male and female aldermen in their use of information
sources. Compared to female aldermen, male aldermen more often use informal face-to-face
consultations with official top managers and other employees, whilst their use of formal face-to-
face meetings and consultations is somewhat lower. However, the possible relationships between
gender and an alderman’s use of information sources are far from completely clear (proposition
4a).
The survey shows that large municipalities more often include output information in their
planning and control documents, which could be regarded as evidence for the ‘sophistication’ of
their accounting systems (proposition 5a). However, aldermen of large municipalities seem to be
not really satisfied with the available information, because they make limited use of it in their
work. The findings of the survey also show that – compared with aldermen of large municipalities
– aldermen of relatively small municipalities use sources of informal information at least as often,
while they use formal, written performance information more frequently (proposition 5b).
Aldermen in large municipalities relatively often use formal face-to-face information, i.e. formal
meetings and consultations with official top managers and other civil servants. These findings
indicate that aldermen in larger municipalities do relatively often use certain types of formal
information. However, the kind of formal information they prefer is probably not written
information in planning and control documents and policy notes, but rich, face-to-face
information in meetings and other formal consultations.
On the whole, the characteristics researched in this paper can at best partially explain
some of the observed differences between aldermen in terms of their use of sources of
performance information. The characteristics in question probably were only limitedly related to
aldermen’s opinions on and use of information.
The survey showed that aldermen’s use of sources of information is not influenced
significantly by their years of experience. The same is true for the number of years during which
a municipality includes output-oriented performance information in planning and control
documents. In the survey, the aldermen indicated that more experience of output-oriented
planning and control documents in municipalities had resulted in planning and control documents
of slightly higher quality. The aldermen of ‘experienced’ municipalities indicated more often that
the documents contained many performance indicators and that realized performances are
mentioned in annual reports. However, this did not influence their opinions on the importance of
output-oriented performance information to their day-to-day work. The survey shows that the
aldermen of municipalities which had used performance indicators for five years or more used
informal information provided by official top managers the most. It is not clear whether this
indicates that after some years of experience the aldermen realize that the available performance
information is of little value to them. Anyway, it seems that there are limited ‘positive’ learning
effects, i.e. an increasing use of output-oriented performance information in the long run.
On the whole, the survey indicates that Dutch aldermen only limitedly appreciate and use the
available performance information in planning and control documents. It seems, however, that
these findings do not automatically imply that the aldermen of Dutch municipalities are of the
opinion that performance indicators in budgets and other documents cannot have a meaning for
their municipality or certain groups within it.
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Of course, aldermen’s formal use of information and communication behaviour may only
represent ‘ritualistic responses to the need to appear competent, intelligent, legitimate, and
rational’ (Trevino, Daft, and Lengel (1990), p. 85). This opinion closely resembles Staw’s
opinions on rationality and justification in (public) organizations (Staw (1990), pp. 77-79; see
also DiMaggio and Powell (1983), pp. 150-154; Hopwood (1990); Covaleski, Dirsmith and
Samuel (1995), pp. 24-30; Olson, Guthrie and Humphrey (1998)). Formal attempts to define
output goals and to use performance indicators in governmental organizations could be such a
form of ‘justification’ or of ‘rational economic behaviour’ which is expected by groups within
and outside the organizations.
However, according to Staw the introduction of performance indicators in governmental
organizations could make sense to these organizations, even it were only a formal, ‘ritualistic
response’. Staw observes that there can be much uncertainty in public organizations because of
general ambiguity over goals, subjective social goals in such policy fields as welfare, education
and health, and unclear production processes in such policy fields. When uncertainty in an
organization is high, it is essential to justify whatever goals are chosen and whatever activities are
performed. Aldermen might therefore think that output-orientedness and performance indicators
are vital ‘to provide purpose and rationale’ for internal and external parties (Staw (1990), p. 79;
see also Weick (1977), pp. 277-290; Meyer, Boli and Thomas (1994), pp. 16-22).; Miller (1994),
pp. 5-13; Lapsley (1999), pp. 203-206). Albeit a slightly cynical view that has nothing to do with
economic efficiency: in that sense even a ‘ritualistic’ introduction of performance indicators
could contribute to the continuity and management control of organizations (see Otley, (1980);
Otley, Broadbent and Berry (1995), pp. S36-S42).
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This paper provided a general picture of the opinions of Dutch aldermen – who are elected
politicians - on output-oriented performance information in planning and control documents and
their use of various sources of information on developments and performances in their
organization. In the last few years some more research was performed with respect to experiences
in the Netherlands with New Public Management and output-orientedness, but this mostly
regarded only some specific governmental organizations or a small group of organizations. The
paper also provides some tentative suggestions for further research and further development of
output-oriented information systems.
In propagating private sector management techniques, New Public Management also
propagated the introduction of output-oriented information in planning and control documents.
Perhaps these are only of use to certain stakeholders. However, the survey showed that at this
moment aldermen of municipalities often prefer sources of ‘rich’ information which is provided
in face-to-face encounters.
In order to develop a formal accounting and information system which reasonably suits
the needs and reflects the preferences of a specific group of users, it is necessary to have relevant
knowledge of the behaviour of these users with regard to information. Specific circumstances in
organizations and groups of users may have to be taken into consideration (see also Otley, 1980;
Hopwood, 1983, pp. 288-293 and 299-302; Berry, Broadbent and Otley, 1995, pp. 90-94). More
in-depth research of different groups of aldermen and other stakeholders probably can shed
further light on characteristics, circumstances and behaviour which influence their information
needs.
Technical improvements to accounting systems in municipalities and slight
improvements to existing output-oriented planning and control reports will probably hardly
convince those aldermen who are already sceptical about such systems and reports. Financial
employees may work hard on such improvements, but there is a risk that they will only produce
‘more of the same’. It could therefore be necessary to learn more about users’ specific
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information needs and preferences, and the characteristics which have an influence on these needs
and preferences, before developing new systems for providing aldermen in Dutch municipalities
with performance information. This paper has explored and described a number of relevant
factors.
Just as a basis for further research, a factor analysis of the findings of the survey has been
carried out to identify some underlying dimensions (factors) which explain differences between
aldermen’s use of sources of information. The analysis yielded four factors, each of which has an
eigenvalue of more than 1.0, which can be described as:
- external signals;
- informal, verbal information;
- formal, written, quantitative information;
- formal, verbal information.
These four factors could be a starting point for further research into the use of sources of
information and the development of information systems. With respect to these factors and other
information aspects, it is probably helpful to first detect whether systematic differences exist
between aldermen who frequently use performance information in planning and control
documents and those who do not.
It would be unrealistic to think that accounting information systems can provide aldermen
with all the information they want. Even if the systems include quantitative and qualitative
performance information, they probably cannot please everybody. Aldermen’s information needs
can arise from, for example, personal characteristics, management styles, (lack of) interest in
accounting information or the specific roles of politicians. This paper suggests that aldermen
often prefer detailed, flexible, timely and up-to-the-minute information provided in face-to-face
encounters - although it may be less precise and ‘objective’ - to formal, written, static and
‘outdated’ information. Modern information systems and management accounting can mainly
offer ‘technical assistance’ in developing more flexible, ‘better’ and ‘faster’ information. Such
technical improvements can be valuable, however, if they really meet some of aldermen’s
information needs (see, among others, Parker, Ferris and Otley (1989), pp. 118-126; Stata (1996),
pp. 328-332; Alter (1999), pp. 233-245; Neale and Anderson (2000), pp. 100-105). It could be
interesting to find out, for example, how aldermen would use performance and other accounting
information if this information could be easily and flexibly rearranged - on demand. How would
they use performance and other accounting information which can change from general
information to detailed up-to-the-minute information in an instant?
It could be costly to develop such a flexible information system that reasonably satisfies
the specific information needs of a municipality’s aldermen and other stakeholders.
Municipalities will have to consider whether they are prepared to accept the costs of a custom-
made information system or whether they prefer a ‘standardized solution’. In practice, an
organization’s information system will probably be a compromise between expected yields and
costs.
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This paper and the findings of the survey presented above obviously have their limitations. First,
the questionnaire was relatively simple and brief. After earlier case research (Ter Bogt (2001)),
the survey was a more extensive exploration and description of aldermen’s use of performance
information. However, more in-depth research is needed. Second, the literature mentioned in this
paper and the survey focused only on the information needs of one specific group of stakeholders,
aldermen of ‘large’ Dutch municipalities. From this research, no general conclusions about
‘efficiency rethorics’ or about the meaning of New Public Management for other stakeholders,
municipalities or countries can be drawn. Third, the survey was designed on a meso level and did
not take the micro level of individual organizations and persons into consideration. Fourth, the
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propositions in this paper are mainly based on literature concerning the management and
organization of profit organizations. It may be necessary to use insights from public management
and political science to develop a theoretical framework which is tailored to the specific situation
and environment of elected politicians. Fifth, only limited attention was paid to the
interrelatedness that might exist between (some of) the variables which were researched in this
paper. Sixth, although there seem not to be very ‘positive’ learning effects, it may still be too
early to draw conclusions about aldermen’s use of output-oriented performance information. The
actual implementation of a new system can take some time. Seventh, this paper has paid little
attention to such aspects as aldermen’s personality characteristics, personal attitudes and
management styles, which can also have a major influence on their use of information. Eighth, it
may be necessary to take a closer look at the characteristics of aldermen’s portfolios - e.g.
measurability of predominant outputs and aldermen’s knowledge of predominant transformation
processes - and their effects on aldermen’s use of various sources of information.
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De vragenlijst bevat eerst enige vragen over de begroting en andere planning- en controlstukken





1. Verschijnen in uw gemeente - naast de planning en controldocumenten (begroting, e.d.)
voor de gehele organisatie - ook planning- en controldocumenten per dienst?
a. ja b. nee
 )    *  	 	




2. Hoeveel prestatie-indicatoren en kengetallen bevatten de begroting en andere planning- en








3. Kunt u (globaal) aangeven sinds hoeveel jaren prestatie-indicatoren en kengetallen zijn
opgenomen in de begroting?
a. sinds ….. jaren b. weet niet
4. In welke mate wordt voor de in de begroting vermelde producten/prestaties ook de kostprijs
per eenheid product/prestatie vermeld?
a. in alle gevallen
b. in vrij veel gevallen




5. In hoeverre bent u het eens met de volgende uitspraak?:
‘De in de begroting vermelde prestatie-indicatoren en kengetallen zijn voor een zeer groot
deel standaardinformatie die door ambtenaren kan worden afgedaan. Behalve als het gaat om
nieuw beleid of politiek gevoelige zaken, bemoei ik me er als wethouder weinig mee.’
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a. zeer sterk mee eens
b. mee eens
c. mee eens noch oneens/neutraal
d. mee oneens
e. zeer sterk mee oneens




c. af en toe
d. nauwelijks
e. nooit
7. In welke mate rapporteert de ( over de (   ten
aanzien van de in de begroting opgenomen prestatie-indicatoren en kengetallen?
a. in vrijwel alle gevallen
b. in vrij veel gevallen




8. In welke mate zijn de in de begroting, jaarrekening en managementrapportages vermelde
prestatie-indicatoren en kengetallen van belang voor uw dagelijks werk als wethouder?
a. in zeer grote mate
b. in vrij grote mate
c. in beperkte mate
d. nauwelijks
e. niet
9. In welke mate maakt u bij het beoordelen van de prestaties van organisatie-onderdelen
















Vergaderingen/formeel overleg met ambtelijke








































































10. Kunt u de productie/prestaties van organisatie-eenheden  beoordelen op basis van
 de prestatie-indicatoren en kengetallen die zijn opgenomen in de planning- en
controldocumenten (begroting, managementrapportages, jaarrekening)?
a. ja b. nee c. weet niet
.......................................................
16. Tot slot een vraag over het aantal jaren dat u raadslid en wethouder bent.
Aantal jaren lid van de gemeenteraad: ….
waarvan als wethouder: ….
17. Eventuele opmerkingen/toevoegingen van uw kant:
……….………………………………………………………………
…………………….…………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………….
